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Summary
This study examines whether social security influences the aggregate retire-
ment rate in Canada. The life—cycle model of individual behavior provides the
foundation for this study. The model indicates how social security can affect an
individual's decision to retire. Further, the model is used to specify the variable
that measures this effect. This variable is social security wealth which equals the
present value of the social security benefits to which an individual is entitled.
The model for individual retirement decisions is used to construct a model for the
aggregate retirement rate.
Time series data from Canada include a measure of social security wealth that
matches the specification given by the life—cycle model. The estimate of the model
yields evidence that social security induces retirement. An increase in social
security wealth of approximately $2300 per capita measured in 1971 dollars has been
estimated to raise the retirement rate by 5 to 6 points. The effect of the creation









Social security is a major source of income support for retirement in
Canada; the program paid benefits of approximately $4.5 billion in 1975. These
benefits are provided through a combination of threeprograms that make up
the social security system. These programs are':
(1) Old Age Security, a universal program with a benefit paid to all
who reach age 65;
(2) Canada and Quebec Pension Plan, a social insurance plan with earn-
ings-related benefits to those who contributed during their working
lives;
(3) Guaranteed Income Supplement, a social welfare plan with benefits sub-
ject to an income test.
The provision of a pension as a right under Old Age Security is based on the
assumption that people retire because of poor health or because they are forced
out of their jobs and pension benefits compensate, in part, for the concomitant
reduction in earnings. This assumption implies that social security should have
little or no effect on retirement. The purpose of this study is to examine
whether this view is correct.
Static labor supply theory holds that a person retires when his market
wage is less than the value of his time in nonmarket activity.2 Theoretical
work on life-cycle labor supply3 has generalized this static condition. The
generalization is due to the dynamic nature of the life-cycle model, which
uses the path that a person's wage follows, his subjective rate of discounting,
andthemarket rate of interest. Social security can have additional economic
effects on the retirement decision in the life-cycle model. Section I discusses
in more detail how social security can influence retirement using the life-
cycle model.42
The main implication of the theoretical discussion is that a social
security variable (derived from the lifetime budget constraint) be included
in an econometric analysis of the retirement decision. The standard model
of labor force participation is used to construct a model for the aggregate
retirement rate; this model includes the variable that measures social securi-
ty's effect on retirement. The development of the model and a framework for
evaluating how economic variables may influence retirement are given in section
II.
The time series data used in this study come from the Economic Council
of Canada. The data include an estimate of the value of the social security
benefits that individuals are entitled to receive. Benefits are evaluated
in a way that matches the specification of the variable derived in the
theoretical discussion for measuring social security's effect on retirement.
The data and empirical specification of the model are given in section III.
This section also discusses how a consistent estimate of the model is obtained.
The estimate of the model for the aggregate retirement rate is given in sec-
tion IV. The study is summarized and concluded in section V.
I. The Life-Cycle Model and Social Security
The effect of social security on retirement will be discussed using
the model of life-cycle behavior. In the absence of social security, an in-
dividual chooses a path of lifetime consumption and labor supply by maxi-
mizing lifetime util:i.ty subject to the following constraint:
(I) ctut = WttDt
where T =yearsin an individual's life
c =consumptionexpenditures in year t3
=laborsupply in year t




=wagerate in year t
=discountfactor from year t to whatever year defines
present value
This simply says that the present value of total lifetime consumption must equal
the present value of total lifetime earnings.
Social security lowers a person's earnings over his working life by
collecting contributions, and raises his income during retirement by paying





where Pt =contributionrate in year t
b =socialsecurity benefit payments in year t
The second term on the right-hand side of eq. (2) will be called "social securi-
ty wealth" and denoted SSW. It represents the actuarial present value of social
security benefits to which an individual is entitled (the survival probabili-
ties that make itan actuarial calcualtion are included inDt). If SSW equals




Inthis case, eq. (2) is equivalent to eq. (1) and there is no change in indi-
vidual behavior. however, if SSW exceeds the present value of contributions,
social security has raised a person's lifetime income. The life-cycle model
predicts a potential decrease in labor supply on the usual assumption that4
leisure is a normal good. This decrease could occur as a reduction in labor
supply (z.)inall years of a person's life or in the number of years of
work (R-l).It may be harder to do the former because employers offer jobs
only at standard hours of work. This is a reasonable observation, but only
suggests that early retirement is the feasible alternative. This paper will
not examine labor market constraints or arrangements between the firm and
employee to reduce hours of work. The main point here is that the lifetime
income effect can cause early retirement.
Barro's (1974) theory of life-cycle behavior with bequests implies that
there is no lifetime income effect. Intergenerational transfers cancel any
change in lifetime income imposed by social security. The data used in this
study permit a good calculation of how social security affects an individual
over his own lifetime. However, there is little information on transfers
suitable for this study. Consequently, this paper does not address the
Barro thesis on theoretical grounds by incorporating bequests because this
cannot be carried through in the empirical analysis. However, Barro's argument
depends on the assumption that lifetime labor supply is fixed. This paper
examines that assumption. Evidence that social security influences retirement
at least challenges Barro's conclusion that social security has no effect on
other economic behavior.
Another effect of social security comes from the influence of an addi-
tional year of earnings on an individual's basic benefit. This influence
arises because hisbenefitis computed from an average of his annual earnings.
To see this effect consider the change in the budget constraint when a per-
son works in year R instead of retiring:S
T R T
(4) cD = (_pt)wttDt
+SSW-
bRDR
+ (b_b)D t1 tl r=R+l
where b =thebenefit obtained in year t by adding another year of
earnings in the benefit calculation.
Benefits in year R are forgone as shown by substractinghR from SSW. However,
earnings in year R may raise benefit payments in the future. Whether another
year of work is worth it with respect to social security is decided by comparing
the forgone benefit payment with the present value of the increase in future
payments. Thus, earnings are not the only compensation for market work.
There may be additional compensation from an earnings-induced increase in the
basic benefit. Like the direct monetary compensation ofwage payments, the
increase in future benefits can have a price effect on behavior.
The main point of this section is that social security has two potential
effects on retirement: a lifetime income effect measured through SSW, anda
price effect arising from an earnings-induced increase in benefits. The time
series data used in this study provide a good measure of SSW. However, it is
not clear how to measure the price effect or whether it can be measured in
time series data. The price effect is probably best examined ina cross-section
dataset in which an accurate observation on individualwage rates is given. In
this study, the coefficient for wages will incorporate the effect of additional
compensation for market work coming through social security. The retirement
model that will he developed in the next section will include SSW for the
purpose of testing the hypothesis that social security affects retirement.
II. The Retirement Model
The analysis of labor force participation by Clark and Summers(1978)
is used to construct an econometric model for estimating the effect of social
security on retirement. The theory underlying the model assumes that indivi-6
duals maximize an intertemporal utility function of the form:
(5) U
IJ(c1,
.. ., c,,, ...,
subjectto the budget constraint given by eq. (2). Since the focus of atten-
tion is on retirement decisions the analysis does not rely heavily on first-or-
der conditions for the maximization of eq. (5) subject to eq. (2). As a result,
a more concise expression for the utility function than eq. (5) can be adopted:
(6) U =EJ(ci,c. cr1. t-l' t' t÷l
where the period t-l now summarizes the past up to year t and t+l, the future
after year t.
An individual's retirement decision depends on the minimum wage at which
he will participate in the labor force. This minimum wage is his reservation
wage, s, given by UL /Uc .Inother words, Sequalsthe rate at which
tt
theindividual trades leisure for market goods. The hypothesis in
this study is that s depends on social security wealth, SSW, as well as other
variables that usually affect reservation wage. These other variables are
past employment, future wages and prices, and tastes. The shadow price relation-
ship is given in the following general form:
(7) s =f(SSW,
w '' -i'b)
where the superscript e denotes expected future values and the variable b
measures unobserved determinants of shadow price like tastes or ability. An
individual will retire when his shadow price of time exceeds his market wage,
w. Thus, an individual's decision to retireis expressed formally as:7
(8) w < s =f(SSWt,w '' ' b)
The aggregate retirement rate is derived from the preceding model for
the individual.In general, individuals face different wages and have different
employment experiences, expectations and tastes. As a result, market and
reservation wages have a joint distribution; g(w, s), in the population. The
aggregate retirement rate, R, is given as follows:
(9) R =ff g(w,s) dwds
w<s
This equation implies that the retirement rate is a function of marketwage and
the variables that influence shadow price. A logarithmic functional form is
assumed so that eq. (9) becomes:
(10) n R =+ 2n SSW + £n w L9,w:+
ifl 11 + + v
where v is a disturbance term.
It is useful at this point to consider the expected signs of the coef-
ficients for the model. When SSW increases, the lifetime income of alarger
segment of the population is likely to be increased by social security. As
discussed in section I, the lifetime income effect works to reduce laborsupply.
Retirement is one way in which this reduction can take place. Consequently,
is cxl)ectcd to bc positive. The majorpurpose of this study is to examine
whetherRMSSW hasa positive coefficient in eq. (10).
The expected signs of other coefficients depend on what view is taken
about labor force participation in the life-cycle model. Two views ofparti-
cipation, which are discussed by Clark and Summers (1978), are relevant in this8
study. One view is the timing hypothesis which states that individuals sub-
stitute market work for nonmarket activity in response to transitory movements
in real wages. As a result, individuals time their labor force activity so that
they work more when wages are high and less when wages are low. This follows
from separating life-cycle decision making into two steps. First, individuals
determine how much total time they will spend in their lifetime based on their
average wage. Also, they know that their wage will fluctuate around the average.
Consequently, in the second step, they distribute their working time so that
periods of high labor supply are timed with periods when wages are high. The
timing hypothesis has been developed formally by Ghez and Becker (1974) who
state it succinctly when they say: "In our analysis there is no income or wealth
effect because all changes in wealth are perfectly foreseen. Hence, a rise in
wage rates with age generates only substitution effects, and the supply curve
of labor would be positively sloped." (p. 12).
The first, most obvious conclusion to draw from the timing hypothesis
is that the retirement rate will be low when w is high. Hence is expected
to be negative. The timing hypothesis also implies how the retirement rate
should respond to w and ir. If individuals expect future wages to be high
relative to current wages they will work less in the current period. Therefore,
should increase when w1 is high so that the expected sign of is positive.
The argument for a positive also implies that should be negative. This
follows because future real wages will be lower when future prices are expected
to be higher. Ulnally, employment experience should have no effect on current
behavior according to the timing hypothesis. Any fluctuations in employment
occur in response to transitory wage changes. Because these changes are tran-
sitory, employment will not be correlated between periods and hence should
be zero.9
Thesecondview of labor force participation is the persistence hypo-
thesis which emphasizes employment experience as a determinant of current
participation. This view is based on recent econometric studies5 of labor
supply which posit that an individual's past labor force status can have an
effect on current status. This effect is independent of influences exerted
by economic variables like wages, prices, and wealth, or individual differences
in behavior. This hypothesis, defined as state dependence in the econometrics
literature, asserts that there is a real effect of occupying a certain state
of economic activity on future behavior. As a result, individuals who have
participated in the labor force will continue to do so, while those who have
retired will stay in that state. The persistence hypothesis implies less
movement between retirement and work in response to economic incentives than
the timing hypothesis.
The persistence hypothesis suggests a pattern of coefficients in the
model that differs from that given by the timing hypothesis. Both hypotheses
predict that higher current wages will decrease the retirement rate. However,
because those who are retired are likely to stay retired under the persistence
hypothesis, the magnitude of the wage effect will be smaller. Also, this
hypothesis holds that labor force status is correlated over time implying that
individuals do not closely match their labor market activity with random fluctu-
ations in wages. Consequently, future wages and prices will have a negligible
impact on current retirement status so that 83 and 84 are expected to be close
to zero. However, while the timing view predicts that is zero, the persis-
tence hypothesis is given by the assertion that past experience influences cur-
rent behavior so that 135 should be nonzero. The sign of 85 will follow from
the definition of employment experience.10
In this section a model has been developed for examining theeconomic
determinants of the aggregate retirement rate. The effect of socialsecurity
on retirement is the main focus of attention. This effect is measuredthrough
social security wealth which enters the model as anexplanatory variable
whose coefficient is expected to be positive. Two hypotheses of laborforce
activity provide a framework for evaluating the effect of other economic
variables. The hypotheses of timing and persistence make differentpredictions
about the coefficients of variables. When one hypothesispredicts that a coef-
ficient should have a certain sign, the other predicts a zeroor, at least,
smaller coefficiently. Therefore, expectations are notcompletely indeterminate
as a result of these different hypotheses. Empirical results from estimating
the model will show whether expectations are borne out in observed behavior.
Before this can he done the variables discussed in general in this sectionmust
be defined based on actual data. Also, an estimation technique must beadopted
that solves econometric problems posed by the model. The next section is devoted
to these tasks.
III. Specification and Estimation
Operational measures of the variables discussed in the last section must
be developed before the retirement model can be estimated. The data base for
estimation is time series data for Canada provided by the Economic Council.6
'I'he data give measures of social security wealth, labor forceparticipation
rates, wages and prices in the period 1946-1975. All monetary values are
expressed in 1971 dollars in the empirical specification of the model.
ln this study, SSW is defined to be the present value of Old Age Securi-
ty (OAS) benefits to which individuals are entitled; this present value is divided
by population to give a per capita measure of SSW. There are a few reasons for11
restricting attention to the OAS plan. One reason is that contributions
from earnings are made only in the Canada and Quebec PensionPlan, CQPP.
If CQPP satisfies eq. (3) (the present value of contributionsequals the
present value of benefits), then this plan does not contribute to the lifetime
income effect of social security. For the populationas a whole CQPP approxi—
mately satisfies eq. (3). Therefore, in a model for the aggregate retirement
rate, it is not necessary to include CQPP benefits in SSW. Evenso, lifetime
income may be redistributed between individuals and this redistribution
may influence the aggregate retirement rate. However, even for the individual,
CQPP contributions balance benefit payments to some extent and this mitigates
the lifetime income effect of CQPP. Another reason forexcluding CQPP benefits
from SSW is that including these benefits wouldpose problems for the measure-
ment of SSW. Problems arise because CQPP became effective in 1966. Asa result,
the time series for the value of CQPP benefits iszero up to 1966 and then
jumps to some nonzero value. Such a series essentially signals the creation
of CQPP and adding it to SSW would only blur what SSW issupposed to measure.
A binary variable, DCQPP, is added to the model tocapture the effect of the
creation of CQPP.7 It could be argued that the public anticipatedCQPP so that
the present value of CQPP benefits becomes positive before 1966.However, the
measurement of anticipated unlegislated benefits is not an objective in this
study.
The reason for not including Guaranteed Income Supplement(GIS) benefits
in SSW is that these benefits are inversely related to OAS andCQPP benefits and
are earnings—tested. Thus, GIS benefits are a small component of social
security intended for low earners.It is important to note that OAS accounted
for approximately 80 percent of social security benefitpayments in 1975. Con-
seqently, restricting SSW to OAS benefits is justified on practicalgrounds.12
The wage variable, w, is the per capita wage. A regression of w
its values for the past three years is used to construct expected wages. The
value of w predicted by this regression equals the expected wage variable, w.
Adding the fourth lagged observation on wage or a time trend to the regression
did not substantially change the final results.
The price expectations of the population in a given year are summarized
by the inflation rate for that year. In other words, peopl&s attitude about
future prices are formed by price changes in the current year. The inflation
rate observed at the end of the year summarizes the price expectations formed
during the year. Thus, the rate of change in the consumer price index equals
the expected price variable, i.Anattempt was made, along the lines of what
was done for wages, to calculate expected prices based on a regression for
price changes. The fitted values of this regression never followed actual
values well enough to justify using the regression for computing a price
expectation variable.
The labor force participation rate is used to define both the retire-
ment rate and the employment experience variable. The retirement rate, R,
equals 100 minus the labor force participation rate for persons aged 65 and over.
The definition of the employment experience variable, £tl is based on the
assumption that employment experience is described, at least in part, by past
participation rates. This is equivalent to saying that i1 depends on past
values of R because the participation and retirement rates differ by a constant.






where L is the lag operator. For the moment, let the other variables and their
coefficients be summarized by Z so that the model can be written as:
£n R
(12) +v
Multiplying through by 1-AL yields the following:






Some implications for estimating the model follow from this tranformation.
Lagged values of the independent variables must be included in the empirical
estimation of the model. As a result, A is estimated by the negative of the
ratio of the lagged coefficient of a variable in Z to its current coefficient.
Of course, A is overidentified when Z contains more than one variable. An
important feature of the transformation for estimation purposes is that the
transformed error term is correlated withRti. Consequently, ordinary least
squares estimates of eq. (13) are inconsistent. A method for consistently
estimating the model must be sought.
Before discussing consistent estimation, it is important to recognize
the full source of potential correlation betweenRt1 and the error term.
There are two ways in which this correlation can occur. First, as mentioned
above, the error term in the model to be estimated equalsv -Avt1which is
correlated with Rti. Second, the v's may be serially correlated independently
of the transformation implied by eq. (11) and hencev is correlated with R1.
Therefore, either eq. (11) or serial correlation among the v's induces cor-
relation between and the error term.8 There are techniques9 for consis-
tently estimating the model when the error term is serially correlated and the
model includes a lagged dependent variable. These techniques require some14
assumption about the pattern of serial correlation. Johnston (1972) points
out that these methods are computationally burdensome and "one would only
embark on them if one felt very convinced about the specification of the
disturbance term." For these reasons, these techniques are not employed
here.
The method of two-stage least squares (TSLS) is used here for obtaining
a consistent estimate of the model. Potential correlation between Rti and
the error term from either source discussed above is eliminated by using
instrumental variables for 1t-l The model suggests what instruments to use;
they are the twice—lagged values of the Z's. These instruments appear as
explanatory variables in the equation for Rt1 and hence are correlated with
R1. Also, they are uncorrelated with the error term in the model by con-
struction. Consequently, TSLS yields consistent estimates whether Rt_i is
correlated with the error term because of eq. (13) or because the v's are
serially correlated. The consistency of TSLS does not depend on a particular
specification for serial correlation among the v's.
Two variables are added to the model to measure other factors that
may influence the retirement rate. The unemployment rate, UR, is added to
account for general market conditions. The model also includes a time trend,
TIME,tocontrol for a common trend component that may be present in both R
andotherright-hand side variables. This trend component could make a right-
hand side variable appear to have a causal effect on R when no such effect is
present.
Given the variables described in this section, the empirical specifica-
tion of eq. (13) is:15
(14) n Rt 1() + YnSSW +3j DCQPI) +thw
+nwe+4n7re+ (85+A) £nRt1
+ LnUR + TIME- 2nSSW1




Thefocus of attention is on the estimates of and which measure the effect
of social security on retirement.
IV. Empirical Results
This section presents the estimated model for the aggregate retirement
rate. The estimate of the model obtained by two-stage least squares is given
in Table 1. Of primary interest are the positive coefficient estimates for
the variables measuring social security's effect on retirement -£nSSW and
DCQPP. The measurement of these coefficients is the main focus of this study.
The signs of other coefficients conform with expectations but the
estimates are generally imprecise, except for the price expectations variable.
i'here are (at least) two reasons for not obtaining precise estimates. First,
there is a loss of efficiency when two-stage least squares is used. In other
words, there is a cost in terms of lost precision when the simplest way of
getting consistent estimates is employed. The second reason is that the re-
tirement rate for 65 year olds and over is being explained by economic variables
measured for the entire population. Consequently, the economic effects of these
variables on retirement are attenuated. In light of these reasons, theTable 1




































Footnotes to Table 1
+Themethod of two-stage least squares is used to estimate the model in the
period 1948-1975; the first two years of the original sample period 1946-
1975 had to be dropped to allow for the twice-lagged values of thevariables
used as instruments for .nR1. The "t" subscripts are dropped and the
"-1" subscript denotes lagged values.
*Theinstrumental variables for inR1 are the twice-lagged values of the
explanatory variables -in
SSW2, in w, in we2, h12and in IJR218
empirical results are somewhat encouraging. In the following discussion,
the effect of a variable is illustrated by calculating the change in the
retirement rate when the value of that variable is increased by two standard
deviations around its mean and the other variables are held at their mean
values.
The estimated effect of social security on retirement is in accord
with expectations. Based on the life-cycle model of behavior, high social
security wealth was expected to induce retirement through a lifetime income
effect. The positive coefficient estimate for Zn SSW is evidence that this
effect takes place. The point estimate of .594 for this coefficient implies
that a two standard deviation ($2300) increase in SSW raises the retirement
rate from 67.9 to 73.2 This estimate is marginally significant; this signifi-
cance is achieved in the presence of a variable controlling for a pure time
trend effect, and of the factors working against precise estimation discussed
above. Therefore, the estimated coefficient for Zn SSW consistutes some
evidence for accepting the hypothesis that social security induces retirement.
Additional support for this hypothesis comes from the binary variable
DCQPP that attempts to capture the effect of the beginning of the Canada
and Quebec Pension Plan. IThen this program was started benefits were paid
immediately to eligible individuals.10 Because they never made contributions
into the program, it amounted to an exogenous increase in their lifetime
income. This had theeffectof raising the retirement rate by approximately
1.5 points in 1967. Thepositivecoefficient estimates for Zn SSW and DCQPP
takentogetherprovide sul)port for the theoretical argument that social
security hasalifetime income effect on behavior.19
The coefficient estimate of the wage variable, 9.n w, has the expected
sign but is insignificantly measured. Accepting for the moment the point
estimate of this coefficient, a two standard deviation increase in real per
capita wages lowers the retirement rate from 75.9 to 63.2. However, the
insignificance of this estimate may be interpreted as evidence in support of
the persistence hypothesis.
The two variables measuring expected future wages and prices enter the
model with coefficient estimates predicted by the timing hypothesis. The
standard error of the coefficient for 9ri e is large so that its sign and
magnitude are not statistically significant. The point estimate of .869 im-
plies that the retirement rate increases from 54.3 to 91.6 when expected
wages rise by two standard deviations. The effect is large but has a wide
margin of error. However, the measurement of the coefficient for £n is
close to conventional levels of significance. An increase in the inflation
rate of two standard deviations lowers the retirement rate from 71.3 to 69.8.
This response of retirement to inflation is expected based on the timing
hypothesis and is of reasonable magnitude.
The coefficients of the wage, expected wage, and expected price variables
have the signs predicted by the timing hypothesis. While only the expected
price coefficient has a significant sign, these coefficients taken together
may be interpreted as providing some evidence in favor of the timing hypothesis.
Such an interpretation would stress the importance of obtaining the correct
pattern of signs for the wage and price variables given the factors working
against precise estimation given above.
The estimate of the model can also be interpreted to give some support
to the persistence hypothesis. The coefficient for 2n has the expected
sign and implies that a two standard deviation increase in the lagged retire-20
ment rate raises the current rate from 67.4 to 73.8. The magnitude of this
effect, however, is not precise. In general, the esitmate of the model can-
not be used to resolve whether the timing or persistence hypothesis explains
behavior. The imprecision in the coefficient estimates makes an inter-
pretation of the evidence in favor of one hypothesis a matter of selective
emphasis.
The coefficient for TIME shows that the retirement rate does follow
the expected trend of increasing retirement over time. The point estimate
of this coefficient implies that every year in the sample period addson aver-
age .3 to the retirement rate. The unemployment rate was added to the
model to measure the effect of general market conditions on retirement. The
coefficient of 2n UR is expected to be positive on the assumption that
individuals are more likely to retire when market conditions are not favorable.
This coefficient is insignificantly estimated with the unexpected sign.
As shown in eq. (14), the factor A measuring the contribution of the
most recent retirement rate to the stock of employment experience can be esti-
mated from the coefficients for a variable and its lagged value. More precise-
ly, A is estimated as the negative of the ratio of the coefficent of a lagged
variable to the coefficient of its current value. The two variables with
nearly significantly measured current and lagged coefficients are th SSW and
IJowever, they give estimates of A that differ; Zn SSW's coefficients
imply A equals .978 and Znir0's coefficients imply A equals -.71. This problem
arises as a result of A's overidentification in the specification of the model.
l'herc is a way to estimate A in this situation. The strategy is to select
values of A in a particular range and compute estimates of the model for A set
equal to each value. The value of A and the associated estimates of the
other coefficients that yield the minimum sum of squares are selected as21
maximum likelihood estimates of A and the coefficients. This isthe technique
developed by Zeliner and Geisel (1970). Setting A equal to a single valuecan
bejustifiedas an identifying constraint. The justification would rest on
the fact that the results in Table 1 did not givea precise estimate for A.
In my judgement it is best to estimate the model withoutincorporating a
priori constraints -at least to start.
The main empirical result in this section is the evidence that social
security affects retirement through the lifetime income effect described in
section I. The underlying assertion of this study is that socialsecurity
can influence retirement and varies independently of other variables that
also have an influence on retirement.
V. Summary and Conclusion
This study has examined whether social security affects theaggregate
retirement rate. The lifetime budget constraint foran indivdiual has been
used to identify a lifetime income effect of socialsecurity on retirement.
Further, this constraint also specified the variable that is used formeasuring
this effect. This variable is social security wealth whichequals the present
value of the social security benefits to which individualsare entitled. The
standard model for labor force participation of individualswas used to derive
the model for the aggregate retirement rate. This model includessocial
security wealth. The underlying assumption of this study is that social
security can have aneffecton retirement that is independent of other van-
ables that also influence retirement.
The estimate of the retirement model obtained in thisstudy yields evi-
dence for accepting the hypothesis that socialsecurity induces retirement. An22
increase in social security wealth of approximately $2300 per capita measured
in 1971 dollars has been estimated to raise the retirement rate by 5 to 6
points. This effect was calculated around the mean values of variables in the
sample period 1948-1975. The effect of the creation of the Canada and
Quebec Pension Plan was to raise the retirement rate by 1.5 points in 1967.
Two hypotheses on labor force activity -timingand persistence -
provideda framework for analyzing the effect of wages and prices on retire-
ment. The evidence on the effect of these variables conformed with expecta-
tions but precise estimates of these effects were not obtained. This impre-
cision did not permit a resolution of what hypothesis explained retirement
behavior.
One purpose of this study, in its conclusion, is that the empirical
results within will encourage further research on the important policy issue
of the relationship between social security and retirement. Two reasons for
there being some loss of precision in these results were discussed. Future
work is likely to improve on the empirical specification and econometric
methodology used in this study. It is my opinion that future evidence will
continue to show that social security induces retirement and will give sharper
measures of the effect of social security and other economic variables on
retirement behavior.23
Footnotes
1. This description is given by Coward (1977, p. 213). A more detailed
description and history of the development of the social security program
is given in Chapters 18 and 19 of Coward's book.
2. See Gronau (1973).
3. See Blinder (1974), Blinder and Weiss (1976), and Heckman (1976).
4. This description is based on my effort (l978a) at incorporating a model
of a pension program into a simplified version of the Blinder-Weiss (1976)
model.
5. See Chamberlain (1978), Heckman (1977), and Yatchew (1977).
6. A listing of the time series data was provided by Peter Wrage of the
Economic Council of Canada.
7. DCQPP is set equal to one in 1967 and to zero in other years. The Canada
and Quebec Pension Plan became effective on January 1, 1966 at which time
contributions were collected from earnings. In order to collect benefits,
individuals had to generate a claim on the system. In order to do this,
they had to have at least one year of earnings covered by the plan. This
year of earnings could then be used to calculate benefit payments. Con-
sequently, the creation of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plan would have
its effect in 1967.
8.It is possible that the combination of the transformation implied by eq. (11)
and serial correlation in the error term produces an error term that is
uncorrelated with -rThiswill occur if v follows a first-order Markov24
process given by:
v =Av+u t t-l t
where the u's are independently and identically distributed. In thiscase,
the transformation leaves only
u.in the error term which is serially Un-
correlated by assumption and uncorrelated withRti. Assuming this to be
the case, a priori, would be heroic.
9. See Zeilner andGeisel(1970), Johnston (1972), or Kmenta (1971).
10. This statement is subject to a slight qualification which isthat eligible
individuals had to generate a claim on the system by havingone year of
earnings covered by the program. This is explained in n. 7.25
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